T O DENY THE EQUATION of justice with death, which the organizer DeRay
Mckesson articulates as the aim of the movement surfacing in Ferguson, MO in August 2014 , is to live in the constant disruption of a society constituted upon antiblackness. To imagine justice, not in the name of the dead, not as the legacy bestowed on their descendants, but as the restoration of life, breathing and tangible, to all those killed by that society's official agents of justice, is to imagine a disruption so profound as to tear open, like a veil, the very fabric of reality available to socialized perception (cf. Hartman).
In his 1940 volume Dusk of Dawn, the scholar and activist W.E.B. Du Bois suggested that an earlier iteration of mass antiblack violence directed his intellectual and political development to a global, comparative orientation:
Lynching was a continuing and recurrent horror during my college days: from 1885 through 1894, seventeen hundred Negroes were lynched in America. Each death was a scar upon my soul, and led me on to conceive the plight of other minority groups; for in my college days Italians were lynched in New Orleans, forcing the Federal government to pay $25,000 in indemnity, and the anti-Chinese riots in the West culminated in the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1892 [sic] . Some echoes of Jewish segregation and pogroms in Russia came through the magazines; I followed the Dreyfus case; and I began to see something of the struggle between East and West in the Sino-Japanese War. (575) 1 The continuity of lynching and police violence is asserted, for example, in the 1951 We Charge Genocide petition to the U.N. (Patterson 8) and cited as precedent for a 2014 shadow report by the Chicago-based anti-police-violence organization taking its name ("We Charge Genocide"). For an important public intervention comparing the rates of contemporary police killings of African Americans to those of early twentieth-century lynchings, see Wilkerson. The question itself presumes to compare police violence and ritualized lynching, two historically continuous forms of racial violence, whose proper conceptualization is at best ethically vexed.
1 Jacqueline Goldsby writes:
a complex history of racial violence is concealed by our increasingly restricted use of the term "lynching." Like an archive, the word functions to denominate the violence, ordering and fixing its meanings in ways that delimit our capacities to interpret it . . . . Ultimately, though, to produce a history of lynching attentive to its constitution and operations through language, we need to invent a new name for the violence. What the word(s) might be, I cannot claim to know. (11) If speaking and writing about this violence feels ethically questionable or compromised, that's because it is, and unavoidably so, as long as the killing continues and justice does not arrive for the dead. The agency you must assert in speaking or writing is itself conditioned by the violence before you position yourself for or against it, and any statement against injustice necessarily risks inviting or inciting the violence that proclaims itself justice's expression and extension. To categorize instances of the violence, to abstract from and compare them, is particularly troubling, because every instance is incomparable and must remain so in deference to the dead. But you cannot escape this predicament by preferring inaction to complicity. What does all this have to do with the concerns of this forum? On one hand, the forum responds to a vibrant proliferation of innovative theories and methods for the comparative study of race, colonialism, imperialism, and diaspora. Sometimes disavowing the term "comparison" itself in order to underscore their political and intellectual distance from its conventional modes, these approaches typically seek a regrounding in the radical thought of anticolonialism and/or Third Worldist revolutionary movements in the U.S. (see, for example, Seigel). On the other hand, this forum contemplates the principled resistances to comparison arising from redoubled efforts to address the profound specificity of the questions of blackness and antiblackness (Wilderson, for instance) . Together, I suggest, these seemingly opposed tendencies express a shared exhaustion with multiculturalism, understood as the prevailing sociopolitical imagination of justice governing global and national relations of difference in the period from the fall of the Soviet Union to the present. As the logic underwriting the institutionalization of ethnic studies, Africana studies, postcolonial studies, and related enterprises within U.S. higher education's evacuating (if not vacuous) embrace of "diversity" as a guiding principle of legitimation, this multiculturalism names the uneasy compromise that enables these challenges to its own modes of comparison. It is my contention, then, that these tendencies are related, at some tectonic level, to the movement that surfaced in Ferguson, as well as to the larger conjuncture of renewed contestations over the meaning of race and racial justice it has come to signify, contestations that are shifting the meaning of those terms and stakes more rapidly, unpredictably, and profoundly than at any time since the 1970s. One might just as easily begin with the death of Trayvon Martin, the acquittal of his killer, George Zimmerman, and the subsequent founding of Black Lives 2 See Garza. A fuller history of these movements would account for the long continuity of struggles against police brutality and associated or overlapping forms of racialized, gendered, and sexualized violence, through decades of intersectional feminist and queer of color organizing, and tracing back through the antilynching campaigns of Ida B. Wells to antecedents in abolitionism and resistance to slavery.
Matter, as a hashtag and an organization, by three black queer women: Patrisse Cullors, Alicia Garza, and Opal Tometi.
2 Alternately, one might attend to the resurgence of a white nationalism, cultivated by elite conservative interests after the election of Barack Obama, interests whose increasingly forthright expressions of desire for race war threaten to fracture the "commonsense" language of formal antiracism governing the post-civil-rights social order. Here, however, I begin with Ferguson, not with the killing of Michael Brown by Darren Wilson, but with the encounter between protestors and police, and with the supposition that the clearest perspective on the present conjuncture is located in the subjectivity of those coming to political consciousness after the fact of the election and reelection of a black president. Moreover, I maintain that the collective processes within these movements are a mode of knowledge production to which scholars should be attuned. Whatever other responsibilities I may be given as an academic or just a creature in the world, I approach scholarship here as a task of learning from collective action: interpreting and extrapolating its insights, supplying those insights with additional or alternative contexts, and rebroadcasting and recirculating them in available pathways.
In brief, then, I argue that the academic debates engaged by this forum find an analogue in a particular uncertainty around questions of comparison and comparability confronted by the movements against antiblack violence emerging in the waning days of the Obama administration, and that together these concerns express a shared exhaustion with the governing sociopolitical imagination of racial justice. Below, I attempt to supply some relevant perspectives on these questions drawn from my forthcoming book, Strange Fruit of the Black Pacific: Imperialism's Racial Justice and Its Fugitives. I begin by relating that study's conception of "imperialism's racial justice" to a reading of two scenes of the production of antiblackness and blackness in the Ferguson protests. Next, I review the book's account of the theoretical approach developed by Du Bois to interpret what he foretold as the century of the color line. Finally, because the general uncertainties around comparison and comparability engaged herein belong to broader fields of ongoing collective action, I conclude with a few tentative observations regarding possible lines of study, as a kind of demonology of comparisons whose value remains to be determined.
Anti/Blackness and Justice in Ferguson, MO
How do you reconcile the notion that you live in a free society with the fact that the police have tanks? It is commonly imagined that the U.S. is not merely a free society, but the freest in the world, in human history, as if freedom were relative and not absolute. If you live in it, you are not required to believe this -you may decry its staggering military expenditures or incarceration rates -but you are expected to live and act in accordance with this belief. One way or another, you are called upon to reconcile this belief with the fact that the police have tanks.
One way this can be done is to say: those tanks are not there to keep me in line; they are there to protect me. They aren't meant to be pointed at me, but at someone else -someone who is different from me in some essential way, a difference which ought to be immediately perceptible to the population in general but particularly to those professionals trained to recognize threats to communal security. A consequence of this intuitive procedure is that my own freedom -my concept of freedom and my perception that I am free -becomes dependent on the unfreedom of that other person -the kind at whom the police need to point a tank. Without such a category of persons or beings, my sense of my own freedom would break down, because the tank would no longer be there to protect me. It would be there to keep me in line.
Several further points relevant to the study of race derive from this analysis. First, while this scene bears and extends a very long history, it also reinaugurates it, generating some degree of novelty, instability, and dynamism; it is certainly no mere vestige of past arrangements. Put differently, this is a scene in which a form of antiblackness is born, along with its object, which may be called a form of blackness (cf. Wagner).
Second, to identify the positions available in this scene is not yet to identify the socially operative categories of race assigned to persons. Its effects must be further processed and distributed among bodies sorted, to the extent they are acknowledged as persons, according to some calibration of racial privilege and subordination. These categories are not strictly reducible to blackness and whiteness, and their black and white subsets are themselves internally differentiated and uneven. For example, this scene dramatizes the aggression of subordinated forms of whiteness, called upon to supply policing's labor, toward those more privileged forms that depend on that labor while preferring to look away from it; it also encourages a solidarity that can be misappropriated as a false unity among categories of blackness. For some, the fabrication of the object of antiblackness is a procedure familiar from its use to target other forms of life differentiated from (but not merely derivative of) white and black Americans, such as the non-alien Japanese, the illegal immigrant, or the Muslim terrorist. Still, it bears repeating that all of these categories, black and nonblack, white and nonwhite, bear some -unequaldegree of subordination and privilege, if and when they are assigned to beings acknowledged as persons. As such, they are all -unequally -invited to identify as free, to identify privilege as freedom under duress: the tank is pointed at you if you are not free; if you are free, it must be pointed at someone else.
To send tanks to a protest against police violence is not simply to repress, but to seek the justification of repressive violence. The purpose of what you might call spectacle policing is to produce the object of antiblackness -a blackness that must be constantly regenerated in order to secure the identification of police violence with justice. This identification is too easily dismissed, but to ignore it is to miss something crucial about the operation of racism. For, if the term "racism" refers at once to structured relations of inequality and to patterns of attitude, thought, and representation, then the latter must serve to uphold and extend the former -which is to say, racism must be understood as always a justification of its own material conditions. Taking this imperative seriously, but without granting its claims, yields a curious proposition: racism must always present itself as the proper form of racial justice, its historical culmination or terminal phase, beyond which 3 The egregious application of a "five-second rule" to distinguish criminal disruption from legitimate protest, since repudiated by a federal court (Lowery) , exposes a general principle of the policing of protest.
4 I develop this argument at greater length in my book, in relation to representations of spectacle lynching, segregationist firebombing, and the U.S. conquest of the Philippines. See also Patricia Williams's suggestive comments on the training in an "aesthetics of rationality" in the legal defense of the police in the Rodney King case.
lies chaos or decay. So when today's advocates of racist policies and practices, genteel or otherwise, claim the legacy of Martin Luther King Jr. or Frederick Douglass, this is nothing new, but a feature common to previous racisms; it is only the historical terms of what is promised as racial justice that have changed. Indeed, what passes for racial justice in one period -expulsion, wholesale slaughter, engineered extinction, religious conversion, cultural erasure -may provide the very definition of racial injustice in another.
In my book, I refer to this, somewhat clumsily, as imperialism's racial justice, although I tend to think the first word is already implicit in the others. "Imperialism" is here understood, in a deliberately protean way, as the desire to rule over difference, to expand dominion across peoples and territories thereby defined as other. This process, irreducible for any historically grounded account of whiteness and of U.S. society, is necessarily grounded in coercion rather than consent, yet imperialism must always seek to legitimize its expansion, however violent, as the arrival of justice. The claim to do justice to difference provides imperialism with its moral authority, political legitimacy, and ideological engine. Now as in the past, this justification is addressed first to a transimperial community of judgment, a figurative gathering of imperial subjects positioned above and before the possible engineering of any imperial ward capable of receiving subordinate membership in that community. On such terms, it may be easier to understand how an annihilating violence may be one form of this justice, yet even then, the imperative of expansion guides violence in the direction of inclusion.
In the scene of spectacle policing, the extension of a deliberately excessive and overwhelming violence differentiates, separating its rightful object from that free citizenry moving along without disruption.
3 This object must be brought to justice, brought within freedom's walls, secured within an internal space marked by death, following the precedents of enslavement, segregation, and mass incarceration. Spectacle policing does the never-ending work of expanding and securing freedom's dominion, crossing and refining and incorporating difference in the violent delivery of justice. Like older forms of spectacle lynching, staged before large audiences or involving the circulation of photographs or physical trophies of death, it calls attention to itself in order to train that attention in what I term an aesthetics of racial terror, by which privilege is perceived as freedom and violence is perceived as justice. 4 Because this work never ends, it must create its object where one cannot be found, and it is always potentially in error -not because it fails to produce its object, but because it necessarily risks undoing the regime of perception it works to establish.
It is possible to say, then, that the militarization of the police might have been a mistake -a careless aberration from the rational application of the policies and procedures of an ethical state -like wearing green camouflage in the snow, a faux pas captured in a photograph of the Fargo, ND police that elicited chastisement in 5 The overlapping of bystander video and other forms of alternative media with the reappropriation of surveillance footage and calls for more police body cameras raises questions about the relations between spectacle and surveillance, as well as the location of resistant agency in the production, circulation, and consumption of visual media, which exceed this essay's scope. For one opening to these questions, see Browne. national media (Fallows) . A reasonable consensus might be within reach to end the supply of advanced military hardware to local law enforcement agencies insufficiently trained in its use. Then again, the wearing of camouflage to call attention to oneself, in military as in civilian fashion, is more common than its use to deflect attention: by emphasizing its operation at the limits of perceptual protocols, camouflage renders invisibility hypervisible, curiously echoing the socialized perception of blackness itself. In any case, the militarization of the police might well be understood as a distraction from the everyday expression of police violence whose protestation brought it into view. A tank was not needed to kill Michael Brown; not even a gun was needed to kill Eric Garner. Nor can these killings be considered mistakes: they are the logical consequences of socially sanctioned assumptions and policies regarding the scope of police prerogative and the policing of African American spaces and bodies for which there is not yet evidence of a collective political will to change. Indeed, this is why many police officers feel aggrieved: they justifiably believe they've been doing the job they were asked to do.
Yet the spectacle of police militarization in Ferguson, which relies on this uncertainty (possibly a mistake/possibly not), is important for two reasons. First, it makes visible the logic of the everyday violence that killed Brown and Garner and so many others. Those instances of the violence were in their own way spectacular, conducted in public, in broad daylight -the deliberate negligence of the slain body in the former case, the dramatic marshaling of overwhelming force in the latter. These spectacles drew onlookers who needed to be managed, kept from disrupting the scene, but from whom the violence itself was meant to be no secret (cf. Goldsby). But while the broader circulation of those spectacles was not managed, the militarized response to protest in Ferguson, mistaken or not, took place after it was clear that the attention of outside audiences was already engaged.
5
Second, and more importantly, the response militarization invited or incited, or was invited or incited by, which may have been the condition of its own visibility, provided the occasion for the production of another form of blackness. The response to the violence of spectacle policing, which spectacle policing insists precedes it, is another expression of violence. Largely symbolic and directed against property, undeniably unequal to the militarized force it nonetheless battles to a standstill, it is the work of a shadowy agency. Whether represented as a tiny minority or proliferating mass, this agency remains somehow impervious to perception, for as soon as one of its actors is identified, it recedes into a crowded darkness. Its violence is important not because it can be translated into a cognizable political objective or demand, but for what its refusal of perceptibility reveals. Whether celebrated as uprising or rebellion, or denigrated as rioting or looting, this violence illuminates a space of occupation and counteroccupation, insurgency and counterinsurgency, by refusing the promise of inclusion in the community of freedom police violence works to establish. Standing outside the bounds of acceptable dissent, it does not debate the legitimacy of police violence as unconscionable mistake or regrettable necessity, or contemplate the institution of reformist or 6 As I discuss in my book, the global infamy of this lynching was deployed in propaganda by Filipino nationalist forces addressed to African American soldiers in the Philippines. See, for example, Gatewood 287. radical alternatives: it rejects the very terms on which police violence seeks justification. As such it asserts the existence of life beyond the dominion of the justice entrusted to the police, a life gathered in the shadows of the imperium, generating the conditions of its arrival into perception as a kind of aesthetic countertraining.
This life is another form of blackness, and if it was always there already, fully perceptible in the everyday sense to anyone borne within it, it was also reinaugurated or birthed anew in the mundane collective practices of the community gathered together in protest, regardless of their opinions about the violent resistance to the police. Blackness in this sense characterizes a community living in the truth of justice. By rejecting inclusion in the dominant regime of justice, the violent resistance to policing opens a space to articulate an opposition between justice as the work of the police and justice as a living Mike Brown, an opposition that is quotidian knowledge for those who gather within it. It is this experience of community, I suggest, that Mckesson refers to when describing the vibrant collectivity drawn together by the protests: "We did not know each other's names last August, but we knew each other's hearts."
By revealing the logic of police violence and exposing a reality beyond its dominion, the resistance in Ferguson disarticulated blackness from the dominant regime of racial justice, opening the potential for new forms of comparison. What might this opening have to offer for movements whose first priority seems to be articulating the specificity of blackness and antiblackness for a post-multiculturalist, post-Obama era? What is there to articulate this particularity to?
The Color Line: Comparison as Prophecy and Method
In the autobiographical account, cited above, in which W.E.B. Du Bois explains that lynching drove him to think comparatively, he identifies one notorious incident, the killing of Sam Hose in April 1899, as the impetus for his transformation from an earnest young scientist into a committed political activist (Dusk 602-03). 6 By that December, in a little-known address to the American Negro Academy in Washington, D.C., he would elaborate a model of comparative analysis whose global reach and prophetic scope was distilled in the text's thesis: "the world problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line."
7 Like Mckesson, who is rightly celebrated for his artful use of Twitter as a technology for organizing, Du Bois understood the motive force of an incisive phrase, and so, after extracting it from the text and dropping the effectively redundant word "world," he repeated the formulation in other writings over the next few years until it would become a great watchword of antiracist and anticolonial thought and practice.
In my book, I resituate Du Bois's speech in its historical moment, which the text itself identifies as the dramatic expansion of U.S. imperialism across the Pacific.
8 Twenty-five years later, Du Bois reassessed his thesis with a similar methodology, in a more famous essay ("The Negro Mind") published in Alain Locke's New Negro anthology.
In elite and popular black intellectual life, the great issue of the day was the recent outbreak of the Philippine-American War. While Du Bois opposed it, his speech takes conquest as a fait accompli in order to celebrate the potential doubling of the nonwhite population under U.S. rule as "for us and for the nation the greatest event since the Civil War" (102). This event endows the striving of the race with world-historical consequence, he argues, for on it depends the destiny of not only the new U.S. imperial wards, but also "the teeming millions of Asia and Africa." Signifying on Rudyard Kipling, he asserts, "No nation ever bore a heavier burden than we black men of America," for if, "as we devoutly believe," the twenty-first century will find "a brown and yellow world . . . whose advancing civilization" puts the problem of racial inequality to rest, it will require the determined effort of his audience: the intellectual elite of the "American Negro" (103).
Du Bois privileges Negro uplift within the broader discourse of racial uplift that President McKinley and others used to justify U.S. conquest, upholding it as the model to be followed by "German Negroes, Portuguese Negroes, Spanish Negroes, English East Indian[s], Russian Chinese, American Filipinos," and others, who in the coming century will "strive, not by war and rapine but by the mightier weapons of peace and culture to gain a place and a name in the civilized world" (107). Yet the counterexample to this exceptionalism, the only other nonwhite group whose historical agency Du Bois celebrates, had not disavowed military force in its struggle against white supremacy. Identified as the "one bright spot in Asia," it is "the island empire of Japan," whose "recent admission to the ranks of modern civilized nations . . . is the greatest concession to the color line which the nineteenth century has seen" (98). When his speculations of "a RussiaJapanese war in the near future" (104) were confirmed just five years later, he was quick to mark another "epoch-making" event: if "for the first time in a thousand years the great white nation is measuring arms with the yellow nation and is shown to be distinctly inferior in civilization and ability," this means "[t]he foolish modern magic of the word 'white' is already broken" ("Atlanta University" 197; cf. "The Color Line" 42-43). In sum, Du Bois's color-line thesis is selfconsciously a prophecy of the coming Afro-Asian century (see Jones and Singh) -an era defined by the jaggedly articulated social and political advances of black and Asian peoples -formulated in direct response to the transpacific rise of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms.
Because it is derived from a reading of historical struggles, Du Bois's thesis is not established on abstract philosophical grounds. Instead, Du Bois tests it by performing a virtuoso analysis of contemporary race problems around the globe.
8 Even so, the key theoretical and methodical implications of Du Bois's color-line writings are worth extracting. The "problem of the color line" is a crisis of accelerated imperial competition that generates intensified processes of racialization, both at the borders and the centers of imperial territories, in order to justify both conquest and mastery as racialized conditions. Because imperialisms are necessarily in competition with one another, this justification, what I've termed "imperialism's racial justice," is directed towards a transimperial horizon, even though, as I argue below, 9 Thus, contemporary justifications of U.S. imperial wars imagine "Islam" as needing lessons in tolerance from U.S. democracy, rather than as an alternative tradition of pluralism-as in chapter 17 of Malcolm X's Autobiography, where the spectacle of racial diversity at Mecca opens the narrator's eyes to the potential of comparative knowledge and the possibility of coalition. the goal of any imperialism is to monopolize the terms of comparison and justice. The color line, then, is a traveling analytical concept for examining how race is made and remade, in uneven and unpredictable ways, across this global field of imperial competition, which may become a space of transimperial contestation for movements from below. The basis of their potential counterarticulations -along, rather than across, the color line -is a recognition of the unevenness of disparate sites of the production and contestation of race -for example, of the American Negro's relative privilege vis-à-vis the Spanish Negro or American Filipino. While the germ of subsequent "darker-races" and Third-Worldist internationalisms is present in these writings, they emerge in continuity with the ideology of the civilizing mission. The self-justifications of imperialisms dominate the discursive realms from which oppositional movements surface. As a theory and a method, Du Bois's color line does not guarantee a particular politics or ground appeals to a transcendent justice, but it does open fissures between the disparate sites of racialization that imperialisms can never entirely fuse, just as they can never achieve their objective of universal dominion.
Over the coming decades, Du Bois's consistent interest in Japan's geopolitical rise -already present, as noted earlier, in his earliest contemplation of lynchingwarranted legitimate accusations that he was insufficiently critical of Japanese imperialism. But like protestors in Ferguson who may apprehend the significance of violent resistance to policing without necessarily endorsing it, Du Bois recognized that Japanese militarism exposed the limits of the regime of racial justice epitomized by lynching. His larger theme was actually vindicated by World War II: in contesting U.S. imperialism's monopolization of the terms of racial justice, Japanese imperialism helped create unprecedented openings that would be seized by black freedom movements, even if its own claims proved disastrous for the populations under its sway.
Broadly speaking, from the 1890s to World War II, the juxtaposition of black and Japanese figures in U.S. racial discourses invoked the threat of comparative knowledge developing in a space outside, and opposed to, U.S. dominion, knowledge which could disrupt U.S. imperialism's claim to be at the forefront of racial justice. Following the war, the U.S. rise to global hegemony, especially in Asia, was promoted as an embrace of formal desegregation and decolonization within a regime of racial justice requiring a massive outlay of comparative knowledge to plot the relative positions of nonwhite groups, at home and abroad, on its path of freedom and development. This project continued to be haunted by AfroAsian figures, alternately represented as comically or menacingly incongruousincomparable -in order to express the irresolvable antagonism between U.S. imperialism's racial justice and the modes of comparison associated with Third Worldism. Comparison is not inherently opposed to or supportive of imperialism, although in particular instances it may have seemed that way, because the monopolization of comparison is one of imperialism's necessary imperatives.
10 See Ferguson, chapter 4, as well as the essays in Hong and Ferguson. This helps explain why this critical line has been most open to indigenous critiques, which also fall outside of the convergences of Third World nationalisms, U.S. liberalism, and multiculturalisms. 11 In other words, even if you stipulate the continued viability of a civilizationist philosophy of world history punctuated in centuries, it does not seem to be true that racialization provides the dynamic link running through the social conflicts currently driving long-term geopolitical changes.
In the heyday of the antiwar and antiracist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the notion of a U.S.-based front of Third World revolution offered a model of comparison capable of leveraging radical transformations in U.S. social orders, bringing distant geopolitical forces to bear on matters of local government or university curricula. But as the prospects of global Third World revolution receded in the late 1970s and 1980s, the forms of comparative articulation they nurtured were increasingly incorporated within a reformed conception of racial justice under U.S. hegemony. Seeing nowhere else to go, some intellectuals associated with Third-Worldist movements formulated an insurgent multiculturalism for a reactionary era, eventually negotiating dramatic concessions within elite cultural institutions by taking up their rhetoric of national representation. The late ethnic studies scholar Ronald Takaki's oft-repeated, cheerfully opaque catchphrase "Diversity is America's manifest destiny" stands as a kind of trickster wisdom for this strategy. Yet, even in this phase of retreat, profound and complex theoretical and practical approaches to multifaceted difference were innovated by black lesbian feminists and other writers and activists whose gender and sexual politics necessitated departures from the heteropatriarchal convergences of revolutionary and cultural nationalisms with dominant forms of U.S. racial liberalism. In the trajectory marked by the shift from "U.S. Third World feminism" to "women-of-color feminism" a rich line of thinking comparison developed that both fed the negotiations of multiculturalism and sustained alternative possibilities. Thus Roderick Ferguson, whose narrative of women-of-color feminism I am largely following, identifies one such alternative in queer-of-color critique.
10
With the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent repositioning of U.S. geopolitical power, from George H.W. Bush's New World Order to Clintonian neoliberalism and George W. Bush's neoimperialism, the severing of a now-dominant multiculturalism from its Third-Worldist antecedents was complete (cf. McAlister and Melamed) . Here on the other side of the century prophesied by Du Bois, any vestiges of a Third-Worldist politics that once lingered in multiculturalism have surely faded, and neither the rise of China and India nor the election of an African American commander-in-chief offers points of purchase for the programs of global liberation once signaled by the term Afro-Asian. Granted, the exhaustion of multiculturalism, corresponding to the decline of the U.S. empire, must be the condition of emergence for an array of new challenges to the conception and prosecution of imperialism's racial justice. But while the method developed in Du Bois's color-line writings, a coldly pragmatic geopolitical analysis, remains valuable, is their prophetic function not exhausted? On the terms of Du Bois's argument, the color line does not seem to be the problem of the twenty-first century, no matter how insufficiently the last one managed to address it.
11 That the resistance in Ferguson exposed a life beyond the dominion of U.S. racial justice is undoubtedly a 12 To be clear, the movements against antiblack police violence in the U.S. have already been internationalized, developing along longstanding solidarity networks. In addition to the aforementioned We Charge Genocide shadow report and associated delegation to the U.N., representatives from Black Lives Matter and other organizations have visited Palestine and Europe (Hing) and made connections to antiviolence activism across Canada, the Caribbean, Brazil, and elsewhere. They have also developed along lines laid out by intersectional feminist and queer-of-color praxis, as in the African American Policy Forum's #SayHerName campaign and the various actions associated with #Black-TransLivesMatter. Analyses of these developments by scholars and scholar-activists are quickly proliferating, particularly in online spaces such as Cultural Anthropology's "Hot Spots" forum (B. Williams) and the Princeton University Department of African American Studies's ongoing "Focus: African American Studies Response Series" on Medium. The specific question I am trying to hold open here is whether comparison can offer these movements an enabling horizon beyond the U.S. imperial order, as was the case with Du Bois's color line, but not with multiculturalism.
problem for the global operation of U.S. power, but it remains to be seen how that disruption might be leveraged towards any future beyond the violence of continual reabsorption for the community living in the truth of that justice.
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Notes for a Field Guide
The title of this essay plays on a phrase in Noli Me Tangere, the first of two novels by José Rizal, the doctor, martyr, and national hero of the Philippines, which has inspired reflections by Benedict Anderson, Vicente Rafael, and others. In the text, the "demon of comparisons" is a fleeting figure of speech that disrupts the thoughts of its young protagonist, Crisostomo Ibarra, upon his return to the Philippines after years of study abroad, displacing the sight of the botanical gardens in Manila with visions of their counterparts in Europe and other colonies. In this moment, comparison evokes a feeling of shame in Ibarra for the diminished condition of his home -a shame that finds expression in a patriotism as passionate as it is curious, since it brooks no division between Spain and the Philippines in seeking the glorious fulfillment of the nation's ideal. Over the course of his fictional career, however, this shame will drive Ibarra to a more militant reformism and then to a revolutionary nationalism, although it is surely an exaggeration to say that his future choices are determined by this brief encounter. The demon of comparisons, as I appropriate it, is that figure of unpredictability and indeterminacy lurking within the knowledge of a world ordered by competing imperialisms that can never finally guarantee the universality to which they aspire. This is why I am ultimately wary of a politics that, dismissing comparison as the justification of a dominant social order, would thereby cede to imperialism the total dominion it can never actually achieve. Serving no master, the demons of comparison will not guarantee a politics; rather, they set you on a journey unknowable in advance, for it is only in collective action that the destination becomes known. In closing, then, I offer a few sketches towards a demonology of comparisons -notes for a field guide, so to speak, whose usefulness I am not yet capable of assessingidentifying four possible approaches to comparison for those forms of study concerned with blackness and antiblackness. I must add that the expansive intellectual and political traditions established by black lesbian, Third World, and indigenous feminists will remain as an imperative and horizon for all four possibilities, whose capacity to learn from and correspond with radical movements may depend on their simultaneous engagement with these traditions as a history of praxis.
13 I thank Keith Feldman for helping me articulate this idea (and others throughout this essay) more fully.
14 After completing the first draft of this essay, I was thrilled to discover the "Ferguson Is the Future" symposium at Princeton's Department of African American Studies, whose speakers have advanced the Afrofuturist connection in a much more eloquent and comprehensive manner. An archived live stream is available at <http://livestream.com/aas21/fergusonfuture>.
The first approach, admittedly backward looking, is one I've attempted to pursue in my book. In it, I examine intersections of African American, Japanese American, and colonial Filipino literatures in the first half of the twentieth century, mining the failures of their Afro-Asian imaginings -those moments that seem hopelessly extravagant, doomed from the beginning, utterly contaminated, or incoherent -rather than trying to celebrate, correct, or prop up their fleeting victories. Against what Walter Benjamin described as "the triumphal procession" of the victorious (256), this preference for the imagination of failure asks what visions might be released in bearing the loss of Afro-Asian worlds.
A second approach, inspired by what I would conceptualize as a structure of feeling of profound pessimism across a gamut of political and theoretical positions, might provisionally set aside comparison in pushing through to despair's farther shore, that teeming region of exuberant plentitude called the blues. Taken as an ensemble of cultural practices centered on collective participation in music and dance, but encompassing the entire range of aesthetic genres and intellectual disciplines, the blues treats such profound pessimism not as terminal -despairbut as a point of departure for the defiant embrace of possibility and impossibility. The way out of no way, as Fred Moten riffs in a recent poem, may also be "a way into no way" (96): "I believe in the world and want to be in it. I want to be in it all the way to the end of it because I believe in another world in the world and I want to be in that" (Harney and Moten 118) . Or, as the eponymous narrator of Gayl Jones's encyclopedic novel of black radicalism, Mosquito, carefully explains to an unnamed black woman novelist who might be read as Jones herself, "the true blues singer got a whole repertoire" (476).
A third approach recalls that blackness, unlike whiteness, has never been defined in terms of purity, and that black communities have historically been sites of hospitality, refuge, and syncretism, able to contain both black and nonblack elements within black space (see, for example, Bald). What would it mean, it would ask, to think of blackness itself as hosting racial difference and sponsoring comparison? Indeed, if you take seriously Saidiya Hartman's insistence (in Lose Your Mother) that diaspora cannot be grounded in the trope of common ancestry, alongside Brent Edwards's theorization of diaspora (in The Practice of Diaspora) as a political project manifested in practices operating across difference, then diaspora itself may be understood as an ongoing enterprise of comparison.
13
One final approach is best exemplified by the Afrofuturist tendency in black intellectual and cultural practices -among whose antecedents, it happens, are forms of black Orientalism, whose speculative imagination never faltered when the dreams of Afro-Asian liberation proved illusory.
14 The problematic confronted by this tendency may be formulated in this way: on one hand, a rigorous analysis of U.S. history, culture, and politics seems necessarily to conclude that racism is a permanent and inextricable feature of the social order; on the other, even a cursory consideration of world history suggests that white supremacy must be mortal.
